Shahzad Chaudhry

How long the march will be is what will decide how August 14 ends up for Pakistan. Million, half-a- million or less. Spread longitudinally on the narrow roads of Islamabad’s Blue Area (narrow because of the quantum of humanity that will populate the roads that day) it will either choke the capital to a halt, or if just sufficient to fill up D-Chowk will fritter away as has been the case in all such earlier gatherings.

If Imran Khan is able to pack the long stretch of the Blue Area roads despite the digging on account of the metro project, the government and the army will have their task cut out. Alone, that may be difficult for IK; with Dr Tahirul Qadri and his centripetal pull on crowds, he may just make it happen.

The most organised march ever to descend on Islamabad was Dr Tahirul Qadri’s long march of 2013; despite the elements it constituted the most disciplined crowds – all his religious followers. After a sit-in of about three days and nights by this most impressive gathering a face-saving exit was contrived for all involved, including Dr Qadri. That is what happens to most D-Chowk sit-ins.

Will the PTI be any different? Given the party’s administrative skills exhibited in KP, or the free-for-all in most of its Punjab jalsas, the prognosis for success seems highly questionable. What you might see instead is impatience bordering on unruliness to a final break-out from the enforced cauldron. This should be the most pressing concern for those responsible for the capital’s administration.

The question if the army will jump in remains moot. They will likely remain above the fray in what they will perceive is a political show-down. If the confrontation gets out of hand, the military, to begin with, will treat it as a law and order problem perfectly within the remit of the civilian administration to handle. The army will move only when a government meltdown is probable – and that then is not at the level of a simple law and order situation; it will be far more consequential. A single march, in a single city, will hardly ever eventuate into such a possibility. The ‘fears’ of calling on the military are, therefore, highly misplaced. Whether such action is appropriate is another matter.

And now to the crux: Imran Khan’s most popular refrain is a recount on the four disputed seats – call it his core concern. In other words, his minimalist position. Imran Khan must have a maximalist position too to negotiate his core objectives. That seems to be evolving as Khan is pushed along the road to agitation by his associates. He, thus, has recently declared that he wants the entire election to be put through a verification process a la recent the presidential elections in Afghanistan. He has also indicated mass resignations of his members (all 34 of them) from the National Assembly as the next step. These are tactics to push the federal government to cede him space in Lahore at the minimum, while he also plays for the maximum in the gamble of his life.

Khan and Dr Tahirul Qadri jumped into an apparent void when the government and the military seemed to have gone head-on on the issue of Geo. Much to their surprise the stand-off did not last long. The evolving national dynamics of security associated issues forced the government and the military to soon close ranks. The army’s requisition under Article 245 in Islamabad is one such salubrious dividend for the government.

That places the army in the government’s corner through a constitutional obligation. How much of it materialises or exactly accrues will be seen. But, it at least assures one thing: come the crunch, the army will not be with the anti-government forces, if not exactly in the government’s corner either. This is an implicit, if not an explicit alliance.

Khan has chosen to fight his battle on the streets rather than in the courts and parliament which would have been the normal recourse if ‘electoral reform’ to eliminate fraud was his real objective. And there may well be method in this madness. The PML-N is least expected to do the political thing of dialogue with Khan unless they now concede on all four seats in Lahore. Since the skipper never backs off, nor do his KP community of members, he must now persist. Which really means that the show is on.

The other key reason why Khan will stay the route is because he sees this as his final gambit. He senses that had it not been for the famed ‘35 punctures’ he may well have made a deep ingress in Punjab developing a winning momentum in place of the Mians of Lahore. If Khan can somehow succeed in creating sufficient doubt in the credibility of the PML-N win he can hope for a mid-term poll where he thinks his perceived popular edge still might hold.

In another year or two, the PPP is sure to rebound and begin to recreate lost space in Punjab forcing the PTI to the third place in popularity in the most populous and hence the most consequential province. Secondly, Khan’s KP government is not exactly trailblazing; he might end up with a lost opportunity instead rising out of inefficient and listless governance there. A combination will push him further back on the national scene. Hence the ultimate gamble: doubles or bust.

Article 245? Well, what obtaining conditions forced its invocation? I think it needs to be better explained to the opposition in parliament. My hunch is pretty clear: the PML-N by invoking the article has ensured that the next three crunch months are covered by forcing the army to keep neutral at the least, and firmly away from the Khan-Qadri combine. If indeed the gathering gets rowdier, which it just might if the numbers are large and uncontrollable for both the PTI and the capital administration, the 111 Brigade will be at hand.

And before we rush to extreme conclusions, the 111 Brigade is a regular brigade of the army that doesn’t do only coups; it also does 245 – under the constitution.

The writer is a retired air-vicemarshal of the Pakistan Air Force and served as its deputy chief of staff.

Source: www.thenews.com.pk